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ABSTRACT
Since the inception of the construct of transaction governance structure (TGS), transaction cost economics (TCE) has
become an important anchor for the analysis of a wide range of economic and organizational issues. As theory of TCE
advances, the perception of TGS has shifted from a polar classification (market/hierarchy) towards a continuum of
market-hierarchy [17][20]. Despite the development in conceptual framework, empirical work based on the idea of the
market-hierarchy continuum is scarce. Part of the difficulty is the lack of clear defined and operational dimensions of
TGS. Although dimensionalization of transaction has received early and explicitly attention, the dimensionalization of
TGS is relatively limited. This paper is an initial effort in instrument building. In this paper, we will (1) review the
literature on TGS, (2) survey 40 empirical studies from 1982 to 2002, (3) present dimensions of TGS based on
Williamson’s work of 1991, (4) run a preliminary test to compare TGSs of brick-and-mortar and click-and-order.
Keywords: Transaction governance structure, industrial economics, contract law, e-commerce.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the recent years, we have observed the broad shifts of
TGS in the United States such as a large-scale
integration among banks, security firms, and insurance
companies [34] and a continuous migration toward
market TGS in the computer industry in which
component manufacturers are replacing fully-integrated
computer manufacturers [23]. This confusing landscape
of TGS changes raises questions about reasons for the
TGS shift, the nature of the new TGSs, and the
influential factors in designing and selecting a TGS. At
the macro level, the answer to these questions will help
policy makers in developing economic and
governmental policies. At the micro level, the answer to
these questions will help company managers to make
decisions regarding TGS, such as what to buy, where to
buy, or how to buy.
The fundamental construct for answering these
questions is TGS. Since the inception of the construct of
transaction governance structure (TGS), transaction cost
economics (TCE) has become an important anchor for
the analysis of a wide range of economic and
organizational issues. As theory of TCE advances, the
perception of TGS has shifted from a polar
classification (market/hierarchy) towards a continuum
of market-hierarchy [17][20]. Despite the development
in conceptual framework, empirical work based on the
idea of the market-hierarchy continuum is scarce. Part
of the difficulty is the lack of clear defined and
operational dimensions of TGS. Although dimensionalization of transaction has received early and explicitly
attention, the dimensionalization of TGS is relatively
limited. This paper is an initial effort in instrument
building. The organization of the paper is as follows.
Section 1 is an introduction. Section 2 reviews the
literature on TGS. Section 3 surveys 40 empirical

studies from 1982 to 2002. Section 4 presents
dimensions of TGS based on Williamson’s work of
1991. Section 5 runs a preliminary test to compare
TGSs of brick-and-mortar and click-and-order. Section
6 is a conclusion.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)
The construct of TGS is defined as the structure that
mediates exchanges of goods or services between
technology separable entities—businesses, subdivisions
of a business, or individual buyers and sellers [46][47].
Ring and Van de Ven further defined TGS as “the legal
forms of governance that apply to different kinds of
transactions (ranging from markets to hierarchies), and
the structural and procedural safeguards that parties
negotiate into a transaction” [38]. Traditional TCE
perceives TGS from a dichotomous view in which
market and hierarchy are mutually exclusive [11][47].
At one end lie purely market-based TGSs, in which
price is the invisible hand that mediates supply and
demand [40]. At the other end, one finds purely
hierarchical TGS, in which a central authority controls
and allocates resources [9]. Typically, attempts to
explain the selection of a TGS for a particular good or
service have been based on comparisons between
market and hierarchy transaction costs [11][46][47].
Generally speaking, when asset specificity of a
transaction is low, market TGS is more economical and
preferable. When asset specificity is high, hierarchy has
the advantage of lower governance costs. A substantial
amount of research has produced results consistent with
transaction cost theory [4][26][27][42][44].
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2.2 Network
TEC rests on the premise that market and hierarchy are
mutually exclusive. Powell [35] does not agree with this
premise or the concept of a market-hierarchy continuum,
which is suggested by John and Reve [20]. Powell
describes the network as the third independent form of
governance structure. Ouchi [30] claims that price, rule,
and trust are control mechanisms for markets,
hierarchies, and networks, respectively. Bradach and
Eccles [7] argue that three control mechanisms (price,
authority, and trust) can be combined in a variety of
ways under each structure, e.g., price and authority
mechanisms under a market structure or a price and
authority combination in a hierarchy.
3. REVIEW OF 40 EMPIRICAL STUDIES
1982-2002
This paper reported 40 empirical studies on TGS from
1982 to 2002. These studies had examined the construct
of TGS either as an independent variable or a dependent
variable. The review of these studies was focused on the
dimensionalization of TGS and the type of instrument
developed (see Table 1, available from the author upon
request).
The majority of studies in 1980’s perceived TGS as
dichotomous and developed single-dimension and
single-item scales [1][2][3][4][43][44][27]. These
dichotomous single-dimension and single-item scales
used 1 and 0 to record the decisions such as buy or
make, integrate or not integrate, use internal work force
or use external agents. Following that, some
multichotomous scales were developed [5][15][21][22].
These multichotomous single-dimension and singleitem scales measured TGSs into discrete categories
(market, joint venture, partner relationships, hierarchy)
along the market-hierarchy continuum. In 1990’s, as the
perception of TGS shifted from a polar classification
(market/hierarchy) towards a continuum of markethierarchy, multi-dimensional and multi-items instruments were developed to incorporate the variety of
cooperative relationships [8][17][19][20][18][29][32]
[33]. Table 1 categorized the 40 empirical studies into
groups according to the types of scale used.
There were two interesting trends among the multidimensional instruments. First, several multidimensional instruments captured the dimensions of
formalization, centralization, flexibility and control
[8][19][20]. Such dimensionalization gave a flavor of
organization theory from Pugh who provided the
theoretical framework for study organization structure
[36][37]. According to Pugh and others, “six primary
dimensions of organization structure were defined: (1)
specialization, (2) standardization, (3 formalization, (4)
centralization, (5) configuration, (6) flexibility” [37].
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Secondly, dimensions of information exchange and
interaction started to appear in middle 80’s [18][29][31]
[32][33]. This trend was coincided with the time period
when global competition intensified, firms moved
towards flatter and more horizontal structures, and
management emphasized cooperation rather than
competition among self-managed teams and among
inter-organization alliances [12]. In the same time period,
we had seen the new research streams in managing
dynamic processes [14], social network analysis [35], and
information processing and conflict management [10][28].
4. DIMENSIONS OF TGS
4.1 Williamson’s Framework
There was no consistence on the dimensions of TGS
among the previous studies. Different scholars
emphasized different dimensions of the construct. In
defining dimensions of TGS, this study is going to
follow the dimensionalization framework put forward
by Williamson [45]. Williamson’s framework was a
recent contribution to TCE studies, and it incorporated
dimensions of TGSs arrayed on the entire range of the
market-hierarchy continuum. Williamson identified the
key dimensions that differentiate three generic forms of
TGS (market, hybrid, hierarchy). These dimensions are
incentive, control mechanisms, adaptabilities, and types
of contract law. The incentive is the degree of the price
acting as an incentive to trigger and control actions.
Administrative controls are the level of control and
manipulative power gained through monitoring, career
rewards, and penalties. Adaptation (A) is the ability to
take the right actions to adapt to the new equilibrium
whenever there are changes in the demand or in supply.
Producers and buyers independently and autonomously
response to the price changes to maximize their profits.
Adaptation (C) is the ability to coordinate among
interdependent parties to align with a collective goal.
According to Williamson [45], firms, hybrid, and
hierarchy are governed under different laws—classical
contract law, neoclassical contract law, and forbearance
respectively. The role of court becomes less important
from classic to neoclassic to forbearance law. Table 2
(available from the author upon request) exhibits how
market, hybrid, hierarchy are different along these
dimensions.
4.2 Fit the 40 studies into William’s Framework
In Table 3, the existing dimensions from 40 empirical
studies were assigned into the five dimensions defined
by Williamson. Although the assignments were
subjective and crude, this exercise was helpful in
mapping relationships and identifying the dimension
that needed further development. As you can see from
Table 3, the incentive dimension was underdeveloped.
There was limited number of item designed for
identifying suppliers’ or buyers’ price sensitivity or
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readiness of adjusting quantity when price and demand
fluctuated.

5. A PRELIMINARY TEST
5.1 Instrument development and test

Table 3. Assignment Of The Existing Dimensions
Into Williamson’s Framework
Incentive through price
•
Exclusivity [8]
•
Pattern of payoffs [32]
Administrative control
•
Monitoring [41]
•
Buyer’s control over supplier decision making [17]
•
Centralization [21]
•
Centralization [20]
•
Centralization [19]
•
Control [19]
•
Financial incentives [8]
•
Monitoring of supplier [29]
•
Operating controls [33]
Adaptation (A)
•
Replaceability of commission income [17]
•
Exit costs [40-A]
•
Exit barriers [8]
•
Restraint in the use of power [18]
Adaptation (C)
•
Collaboration [40A]
•
Collaborative interaction [40-A]
•
Joint action [17]
•
Interactions [20]
•
Behavioral transparency [32]
•
Frequency of interaction [32]
•
Flexibility [18]
•
Information exchange [18]
•
Shared problem solving [18]
•
Supplier flexibility [29]
•
Supplier assistances [29]
•
Information provided to supplier [29]
•
Exchange information [33]
•
Sharing benefi TGS and burdens [33]
•
Adaptation [31]
•
Types of adjustments [31]
•
Information exchange for long-term planning [31]
•
Information exchange for structural panning [31]
Contract law
•
Buyer’s and supplier’s commitment to the relationship
[4A]
•
Formalization [21]
•
Expectations of continuity [17]
•
Formalization [20]
•
Formalization [19]
•
Formality [8]
•
Time horizon [32]
•
Expectation of continuity [29]
•
Contractual focus [33]
•
Relationship focus [33]
•
Method of enforcement [31]

The emergence of e-commerce has provided a variety of
choices of TGS such as online exchanges, distributor
consortia, supply chain networks, auction, and mass
catalog compilers [6]. TEC can help us answer the
questions of what product is suitable for E-commerce
(digital or tangible products), where to buy (brick-andmortar or click-and-order), or how to buy (auction or
private network). In this study, we will conduct a
preliminary test on TGSs of brick-and-mortar and clickand-order.
A penal of expert has generated 24 items (see Table 4)
along the five dimensions recommended by Williamson
[45]. All items were presented with 5-pint Likert scale
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”.
Each item is applied to “online” and “offline” separately
and respondents checked their level agreement
accordingly. One dependent variable was coded 0 for
online and 1 for offline, and five independent variables
were summated scales of five dimensions. Each
summated scale equaled to the average of measurements
of all items of the same dimension. The respondents
were college students. Out of all respondents, 20% had
shopped online at least 5 times, 30% had shopped online
at least 10 times, and 50% has shopped online at least
20 or more times. The sample of 124 was divided into
an analysis sample of 102 observations with the
remaining 22 observations constituting the holdout or
validation sample.
5.2 Result
We performed logistic regression on the data set based
on the equation below [16].

e ax + c
p ( y = 1 | x) =
1 + e ax + c

(1)

Where:
ax=a1x1+ a2x2+ a3x3 + anx4 + anx5;
e is the base of natural logarithms;
y is dependent variable (0, 1);
x1, x2, x3, x4 , x5 is summated variables representing
incentive, administrative control, adaptation(A),
adaptation(C), contract law respectively.
a1, a2, a3, a4, a5 were obtained from regressing result
(Table 5, available from the author upon request). Thus
ax=.187x1+ 2.503x2+ 1.799x3+ .692x4 + 1.349x5 –
19.297.
Table 4. Items For Comparing TGSs Of Brick-AndMortar And Click-And-Order
Incentive
•
There is a big price discrepancy among the same type of
products offered by different sellers.
•
I do a lot of price comparison among different sellers
when I’m shipping. *
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Administrative control
•
A seller has influence over a buyer’s decision-making.
•
A buyer has influence over a seller’s decision-making.
•
A seller does not know very much about you as a buyer.*
•
You as a buyer do not know very much about a seller. *
•
A seller can monitor your shopping behaviors.
•
A seller can manipulate your shopping behaviors.
•
It is easy for a seller to cheat and misrepresent a
product.*
Adaptation (A)
•
A seller adjusts his price and production quantity
according to demand.*
•
Fluctuation of market demand has little impact on price.
•
There are many suppliers making the same or similar
products.*
•
The goal of a seller is to maximize his profit regardless of
loss of gain of any other players.*
•
The goal of a buyer is to minimize his cost regardless of
loss of gain of any other players.*
•
It is easy to become a seller in terms of initial investment
and market entry cost.*
Adaptation (C)
•
Negotiations or discussion between a buyer and a seller is
required to complete a transaction.
•
Explicit communication is required to coordinate
activities among sellers and buyers.
•
A seller and a buyer usually settle a problem by
cooperation and negotiation.
•
I would negotiate and cooperate with a seller.
Contract law
•
A supplier and a buyer usually go to a court to settle a
dispute.*
•
A supplier and a buyer usually settle a dispute through
discussions, meetings, or arbitration.
•
A seller usually has to obey the rules and laws set up by a
local community.

* Reserved.
Hosmer and Lemeshow test measured the
correspondence of the actual and predicted values of the
dependent variable. A better fit would be indicated by a
smaller difference in the observed and predicted
classification or by a non-significant chi-square value.
Our chi-square value was 10.093, which was is not
significant because p=0.259. Table 6(available from the
author upon request) presented the classification result.
In the analysis sample, 74% percent of cases were
predicted correctly. In the holdout sample, 63% of cased
were predicted correctly.
6. CONCLUSION
In summary, perception of TGS advanced from
dichotomous to continuous [17][20], from single
dimension to multiple dimension [29], from local focus
of by-or-make decision [43] to global discussion of
international alliances [21][22]. We also observed the
influence from other disciplines on TCE, such as
organization theory [16A] and information theory [13].
“Big ideas often take a long time to take on definition.
Thirty-five years passed between Coase’s 1937 article
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and efforts to operationalize transaction costs in the
early 1970’s (Williamsom, 2000. pp.31)” by [46] and
another twenty years passed before Williamson
dimensionalized the construct of TGS [45]. The
previous theoretical and empirical works have laid a
solid foundation for us to bring the research forward.
The future research is to conduct empirical studies to
verify the construct of TGS, to apply TEC in analyzing
the whole range of cooperative relationships, to move
TEC beyond traditional commerce into e-commerce.
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